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This paper presents the ambiguous and complex political re-socialisation of Chinese 
immigrant women and their encounter with Taiwanese identity. Contrasting their 
conceptions before and after migration along a central-peripheral conceptual hierarchy, 
this paper elaborates how their nationalistic curiosity and understanding of democracy 
confronted Taiwanese identity in their everyday life. These daily, sometimes mundane, 
experiences manifested the contradictions between the conceptual hierarchy and the 
ethnic divide and partisan politics in Taiwan. Their political re-socialisation proved that 
this conceptual hierarchy was inadequate to deal with the Taiwanese-Mainlander 
divide and the anti-China sentiment. Political  re-socialisation gained through daily  
life gradually fed into their reaction to the Taiwanese identity. Situated amongst the 
antagonism between Taiwan and China, they were locked in an in-between form of 
tension and their subjective identification would therefore be challenged by the mutual 
suspicion and exclusion of both sides which demand their singular and undivided 
loyalty. 
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New citizens from the opposite side 
In November 1987, the government of Taiwan lifted a nearly 40-year ban on travel to 
China.
1 
Ever since the contact between Taiwan and China resumed, marriages across the 
Taiwan Strait have become more common.
2 
Mainlanders (waishengren), the Chinese who 
fled to Taiwan in 1949–1950 with the Kuomintang (KMT) government retreating from the 
lost Civil War, were the first batch of visitors permitted to travel to China. Returning to 
their hometowns, some found wives, who could go on to be their carer in later life. Since 
then, the number of the cross-strait couples has boomed as contacts between Taiwan and 
China rapidly expanded. With more Taiwanese people investing, working, studying, 
travelling and forging expatriate communities in China, the number of cross-strait mar- 
riages increased to include the non-Mainlanders,
3 
and the ratio of younger and better-off 
couples marrying on the basis of affection has  arisen.
4
 
From 1987 to February 2013, a total of 307,876 men and women from Mainland 
China resided in Taiwan with the status of being spouses of local citizens, 95% of whom 
are women (293,631). Between 1987 and February 2013, there were 34% of them 
(99,115) acquiring citizenship, a ratio considerably lower than the percentage of   foreign 
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wives who have acquired citizenship (73%).
5 
As of presidential 2012 election, the ratio of 
citizens from Mainland China in the total electorate was 0.5% in January 2012.
6 
These 
citizens enjoy the constitutional right of political participation in Taiwan. 
As Chinese wives settled in Taiwan, it also became an adopted home for 140,643 
immigrant wives mostly from Southeast Asia.
7 
Whilst the latter are under pressure to be 
made into chaste wives and capable mothers for the sake of Taiwan’s nation-building,8 
Chinese immigrants pose a different challenge. They are situated in a precarious political 
situation defined by mutual antagonism. That is, whilst the growing subjective Taiwanese 
consciousness asserts Taiwan’s sovereign independence from the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), this claim is denied by the PRC, which regards Taiwan as a renegade 
province and the people of Taiwan as part of the Chinese nation. Negating the Taiwanese 
identity by the Chinese nationalism is a defining difference between Southeast Asian 
immigrants and Chinese immigrants, as the former do not carry the baggage of confront- 
ing the self-identity of their host nation-state. 
With this defining difference, it is important to compare the experiences of political 
re-socialisation of the two groups in Taiwan. However, the transnational  political  
context – the PRC’s denial of Taiwan’s de facto independence and the  Taiwan’s  
anxieties and hostility towards China’s threats, in spite of the ever-intensive, socio- 
economic contacts
9 – warrants a separate investigation focussing only  on the  experi- 
ences of Chinese immigrants. This investigation will reveal whether and how immi- 
grants, squeezed in mutual antagonism between the two ends of their migration, can be 
politically re-socialised. The findings will contribute to our understanding of political re-
socialisation taking place in a country where political values, norms, and institutions are 
opposite to those of the immigrants’ natal county and the very existence of the host state 
is questioned. Thus, this paper asks the following questions: How do Chinese immigrants 
perceive themselves in relation to Taiwan? Given that democracy as a value and an 
institution is essential to the Taiwanese identity, how do they perceive  the electoral 
politics and partisan competition? Considering that the clash between native Taiwanese 
(benshengren) and Mainlanders (waishengren) is believed to polarise the national 
community of Taiwan, how do Chinese immigrants position themselves in this divide? If 
they have been politically socialised by Chinese nationalism propagated by   the PRC 
government, would they be re-socialised after migrating to Taiwan? 
 
 
An unknown political force from an authoritarian regime to a young democracy 
There is no shortage of speculations for these critical questions. On the Taiwanese 
government part, Chinese immigrants are essentialised as being indoctrinated by commu- 
nist ideology and Chinese nationalism,
10 
and as such they are feared for disturbing the 
electoral equilibrium and compromising Taiwan’s future negotiations with China. 
Speculations charged by security concerns, nationalistic sentiments, and Taiwan’s pride  
in democracy reached its peak in 2002–2003 when the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) government proposed to prolong the qualifying period of residency for Chinese 
immigrants to be eligible for citizenship.
11 
Although this attempt failed, in November 
2012, the KMT government proposed to require Chinese immigrants to pass a test proving 
their understanding of ‘democracy, civil society and pluralism’ for their citizenship 
eligibility.
12
 
The KMT’s proposal is clearly fathomed along the expectation of Chinese immi- 
grants’ political re-socialisation. Re-socialisation theory generalises that immigrants’ 
longer  exposure to the political system of the host country  correlates  to a higher    level 
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of political adaptation. Competing arguments are that the political beliefs acquired at the 
formative stage may be resistant to change, or that immigrants may transfer the political 
skills gained in the previous system to the new environment.
13 
When the immigrants in 
question are those from non-democratic or repressive countries, empirical evidence seems 
to support each strand of re-socialisation theory. For example, Bilodeau finds that in 
Canada and Australia, immigrants from repressive regimes abstained more from protest 
politics than those from non-repressive regimes.
14 
This conclusion is refined by his later 
finding that although manifesting strong democratic desires, immigrants from partly or 
non-democratic countries are under a long-lasting influence of their natal authoritarian 
political culture.
15 
Similarly, Philippov and Knalefman found that the political views of 
Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union, such as preference to strong leadership 
and hostility towards ethnic minorities, remained unchanged by Israeli political culture.
16 
However, Lien’s study of the broader Chinese community in the US suggests that the 
influence may wane off. That is, although immigrants originating from China have a 
lower participation rate than that of Taiwan and Hong Kong, a longer period of residency 
allowed re-socialisation to take effect and the gap of participation level amongst the three 
groups closed in.
17
 
These studies may shed light on Chinese immigrants’ political re-socialisation in 
Taiwan. Unlike their Southeast Asian counterparts, Chinese immigrants encounter no 
language barrier for their adaptation. However, democratic institutions and practices   
may appear alien to their socialisation under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime. 
Nevertheless, Chinese immigrants (and their Taiwanese partners) have been documented 
for their vibrant rights-claim movement, and staging protests is a common strategy to 
make their demands heard.
18
 
If Chinese immigrants’ re-socialisation in terms of political participation is a question 
with open answers as indicated by re-socialisation theory, it is also everyone’s guess 
whether re-socialisation leads to a shift in their self-identity. In this regard, there is a lack 
of indication in current literature. Instead, what is available is how the host state and 
society react to the settlement of Chinese immigrants. For example, a study employing 
spatial analysis of locations of the cross-strait couples between 1987 and 2006 finds that 
the incidence of such marriages was lower in places where there was a high degree 
support for pro-Taiwan independence parties.
19 
This finding informs more of the political 
orientation of the Taiwanese husbands than that of Chinese wives. Focusing on the cross- 
strait couples’ rights-claim movement, King argues that they succeeded in projecting the 
DPP’s exclusionary citizenship legislation as exacerbating ethnic and political tensions.20 
However, this study did not delve into how Chinese immigrants absorbed and digested the 
‘ethnic and political tension’ that was the chasm of Taiwan’s electoral  politics. 
The exclusionary attitudes of Taiwanese society
21 
and the discriminatory citizenship 
legislation featured significantly in the works of Tsai and Friedman. The former argues 
that the opposition of Taiwanese society towards Chinese immigrants was a case of ethnic 
nationalism.
22 
Analysing the restrictions imposed on Chinese immigrants for their rights 
of family reunion and employment in the public sector even after they acquired citizen- 
ship, Freidman argues that their second-tier citizenship tarnished Taiwan’s self-identity as 
a democracy.
23 
These studies underpinned that the Chinese immigration to Taiwan is not 
only an unknown force to the electoral politics but also poses a challenge to the nation- 
building of the national community. Cheng and Fell take on this entwined issue. 
Examining the KMT and DPP’s election campaign, they find that the Chinese immigration 
was invisible in their publicity per se. Instead, the issue of the rights and entitlement of 
Chinese immigrant women was included within a broader category of women’s rights. 
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They conclude, after further scrutinising the restrictive citizenship legislation, that this 
invisibility and restriction showed the reluctance of both parties to accept Chinese as    
the members of the national community.
24 
This reluctance echoes a critical question 
raised by Friedman: ‘Can a Mainland Chinese become Taiwanese in anything more    
than  name alone?’25 
The above review shows that gaps exist in our understanding of whether Chinese 
immigrant women are re-socialised and adaptive to the political environment of Taiwan. 
This paper aims to fill these gaps and explores their re-socialisation in their daily life, 
including their exposure to the divide between Taiwanese (benshengren) and Mainlanders 
(waishengren), their perceptions of electoral competition, and their responses to Taiwan’s 
bid for membership of international organisations, as these are critical elements of 
domestic politics. Seeing their self-positioning in the Taiwan-China relationship as a 
worldview, this paper aims to find out whether their migration experiences in Taiwan  
have any impact on their worldview, and whether this impact has any bearing on their 
sense of belonging to Taiwan. 
 
 
Framework of analysis and portraits of   interviewees 
To explore the potential change of the worldview of Chinese women, this research 
develops an analytical framework with regards to their conceptualisation of the Taiwan- 
China relationship. Grounded on my fieldwork findings, this paper argues that in the 
cognition of Chinese women, the relation between Taiwan and China is conceptualised 
into a hierarchy in which China is mapped to the centre, whereas Taiwan is placed in the 
periphery. As a worldview upheld by the people of China, this central-peripheral hierarchy 
is a projection of Han-centred Chinese nationalism as indoctrinated by the CCP. The 
historiography of this worldview is composed of four elements: (a) Taiwan is a part of 
China; (b) the Han Chinese in Taiwan and in China are of the same race, ancestry and 
culture; (c) no one in Taiwan, except the aborigines, is entitled to claim themselves as 
native; (d) plurality of ethnicity is not an obstacle for national unity – the 56 ethnic 
minorities in China are members of the Chinese nation under Han domination. In this 
conceptual hierarchy, China is the main and ultimate category which contains Taiwan as a 
sub-category; China is the root, whereas Taiwan is a derivation. This conceptual hierarchy 
is given a boost by the pride in China’s rise as a great power, the expansion of the Chinese 
economy, and the CCP’s denial of Taiwan’s  statehood. 
This cognitive framework clearly contradicts the Taiwanese identity. Central to the 
Taiwanese identity is the re-configuration of Taiwan’s continental Chinese heritage. From 
being the sole source in the past, this continental heritage is now conceptualised as one of 
the influential sources for the island’s cultural inheritance. Thriving on this indigenous 
root of political stability, economic prosperity and cultural richness, the islanders assert 
their right to be treated as a nation distinctive from their continental origin, and an 
independent state separate from the PRC. As shown in the ensuing analysis, Chinese 
immigrant women are confronted with the contradictions between their worldview and the 
Taiwanese identity in their daily life in Taiwan. 
Unlike some of the above-reviewed literature using quantitative data, this paper 
utilises qualitative data obtained from semi-structured interviews conducted in March– 
June 2009 in Taiwan. The intent is not to achieve statistical representativeness but 
contextualising the interviewees’ subjective perceptions of the following categories and 
concepts: Taiwan, Taiwanese (benshengren), Mainlander (waishengren), the people of 
Taiwan  (taiwanren),  Chinese  (zhongguoren),  Mainland  people  (daluren), democracy, 
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voting, protest, unification, independence, the status quo and war. By narrating how they 
encountered these concepts in the events taking place in their everyday life, they demon- 
strated their dynamic interpretations of these concepts in their identities as an outsider, 
wife, mother, daughter-in-law, worker and citizen. The sampling developed from my 
initial contacts in Taipei with a Taiwanese woman who worked for a placement agency, 
an older Chinese woman in her second marriage and a younger Chinese woman in her 
first marriage. The latter two women attended the training courses provided by the Taipei- 
based Chinese Association of Relief and Ensuing Services (CARES). As a result of the 
snowballing of the three original contacts’ networking amongst Chinese jobseekers and 
CARES participants, the final sample included 13 older women and 26 younger women. 
This paper acknowledges that due to the limitations of snowballing, the narratives relayed 
in this paper are the testimony of those who lived in urban northern Taiwan where protest 
politics of a national scale often takes place, and who had regular contact with their fellow 
immigrants because of networking facilitated by CARES or constant encounters with the 
general public because of employment. As displayed below, the interviewees came from a 
wide range of provincial origins, the diversity of which does not generate reliable 
indication of their political orientation towards Taiwan-China relations. However, as 
analysed later, the political and socio-economic differences resulted from their age and 
employment in China and Taiwan render stronger suggestions for their political socialisa- 
tion in China and re-socialisation in Taiwan. 
From Sichuan, Hubei, Guangxi, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan, the 
13 older women, aged between 50 and 70, came to Taiwan for their second marriage. 
More than half of them had stayed in Taiwan for 10 to 15 years, and 8 of them had 
acquired citizenship. All of them lived in the metropolitan Taipei area. Leaving their adult 
children in China, the majority of them (eight) had retired from (or quit) their state 
employment before moving to Taiwan. The majority of their husbands  were  
Mainlanders on their military pension, on which the couple relied for living. Seven of 
them had labour-intensive jobs, including caregiving, cleaning, dish-washing, childcare, 
catering, moving, and construction. A lower level of labour participation, a stronger 
Mainland accent in Mandarin, and not having their own children in Taiwan distinguished 
them from their younger counterparts. What also set them apart from the latter was that 
they reached political maturity after experiencing China’s mass movements of the 1950s– 
1970s in their youth. They made references to the Korean War, the Three-Antis, the Five- 
Antis, and the Cultural Revolution, which was mostly referred to as political turmoil, and 
which was blamed for personal purges and the deprivation of education. Derived from this 
political socialisation and China’s later economic success, they developed a conservative 
political outlook in the sense that they valued socio-political stability and economic 
development and disapproved of political uncertainty and  social  fragmentation. 
Although they suffered the CCP’s repression, as epitomised by Mao Zedong’s reign,   
they did not question the regime’s legitimacy, which was, on the contrary, reinforced by 
the success of economic reforms. 
Twenty-six younger interviewees, aged between 24 and 46, came to Taiwan from 
Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan, Shaanxi, Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Shanghai, Guangxi, 
Guangdong, Fujian, for their first marriage. Nine of them had lived in Taiwan for 10 to  
15 years, and 11 of them had acquired citizenship. Twenty-two of them lived in northern 
Taiwan. Twenty of them gave birth in the first 2 years after moving to Taiwan. The fact 
that nearly half of them were born around the year of China’s economic reform made them 
a generation of higher geographical and occupational mobility. Unlike their older counter- 
parts, only 5 of them were state employees    and 14 of them worked in the private sector, 
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including 6 leaving rural homes in Anhui, Sichuan, and Guangxi to work in Hangzhou, 
Dongguan, Shenzhen and Shanghai. The higher mobility enabled them to comparatively 
conceptualise their movement inside China and from China to Taiwan. After migrating to 
Taiwan, nine of them were unemployed, mostly because of childrearing and housekeep- 
ing. For those who worked, most of them found jobs as shop assistants. Thanks to their 
adoption of local accents, slang and mannerisms, their employment in the service sector 
gave them a wider exposure to the mainstream society. Belonging to a generation of 
political stability, they made fewer references to China’s turbulent past but were more 
discontent with corruption in local government, and showed more elasticity in conceptua- 
lising the relationship between Taiwan and  China. 
In the following pages, I will first of all discuss the perceptions of Chinese immigrants 
about Taiwan prior to migration. Viewed by the above-mentioned conceptual hierarchy, 
these perceptions are characterised as nationalistic curiosity. I will then move on to discuss 
their perceptions of Taiwan’s democracy. Afterwards, I will display how they were 
politically re-socialised after migration. Gained in their daily interaction with family 
members and the general public, they became acquainted with the local political verna- 
cular, which equipped them to comment on the divide between ‘Taiwanese’ (bensheng- 
ren) and ‘Mainlanders’ (waishengern). Applying their prior political socialisation to the 
electoral politics in Taiwan, they viewed democracy from a passive perspective, but this 
did not prevent them from exercising their political rights and participating in rights-claim 
movement. The last section will focus on comparing the older and younger immigrants as 
to whether their conceptual hierarchy was affected by their political  re-socialisation. 
 
 
Before migration: nationalistic curiosity, chaotic  democracy 
As discussed above, Chinese immigrant women adopted a conceptual hierarchy in which 
China is placed in the centre and Taiwan is located in the periphery. Deriving from this is 
a nationalistic curiosity about Taiwan. It is nationalistic because of the fixed belief that 
Taiwan is a part of China. It is a curiosity because, before Taiwan opened the door to 
Chinese tourists, very few Chinese had actually visited the ‘Treasure Island’ (baodao). 
Taiwan seemed paradoxically close to, as well as distant from, China. This paradox, the 
political standoff, and the tightly controlled entry to Taiwan altogether increased its 
mystical lure. 
The seeds of nationalistic curiosity are sewn by education. In the curriculum, 
ethnocentric concepts of nation, and concepts of the collective and the individual are 
allocated with specific proportions in order to nurture pupils’ national identity and 
national pride.
26 
From primary school to university, Taiwan as an object is taught in 
classes of Chinese language and literature, geography, history and political education. 
Wong Hong, a 36-year-old primary school teacher from Hubei, remembered that one 
lesson of Chinese language and literature for 7-year-old pupils stated ‘Taiwan is the 
Treasure Island of our Motherland. Taiwan is a bright pearl glowing in the South China 
Sea.’ Nationalistic sentiment towards Taiwan was cultivated by Taiwan-based Yu 
Kwang-chung’s poem ‘Homesickness’, which depicted his love towards the Chinese 
Motherland and which was recited by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in 2003 when Wen 
met the Chinese community in New York (Asiaweek, 21 December 2003). Documents 
related to the Taiwan policy are also used as teaching materials in the classes of political 
education.
27
 
Before 1979, Taiwan was demonised as a crony of the American imperialists to       
be  militarily  liberated.
28  
Thus,  older  interviewees’  perceptions  of  the  Taiwan-China 
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relationship were framed around the conflict across the strait. For those who lived in 
Fujian, the image of Taiwan was particularly militarised. Fujian-born Zhong Meiling 
recalled that her village was within the range of KMT propaganda packets fired from 
Kinmen.
29 
The packets contained clothing with Republic of China’s (ROC) flag prints, 
banknotes, and pamphlets which described Taiwan as ‘abundant for fish and meat’ and 
which encouraged villagers to defect.
30 
During the Cultural Revolution, people who had 
relatives in Taiwan were categorised as ‘counter-revolutionaries’,31 and were under the 
suspicion of being a KMT agent. Thus, similar to the condemned ‘overseas connection’,32 
connection with Taiwan was a liability which might result in political persecution.
33 
The 
connection also provoked social ridicule and humiliation popularised by political 
doggerels,
34 
as informed by Ming Xianglan, who came from Hainan where there were 
Taiwanese conscripts left behind by the Japanese military after WWII, including her 
husband. 
Checking the rising Taiwanese identity, the conception of Taiwan being a part of 
China was enhanced by the CCP’s attack of Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian 
for ‘creeping independence’.35 The TV programme ‘Across the Strait’ (haixia liangan) 
was utilised to air the CCP’s criticisms. Interviewees remembered watching news in which 
the PLA threatened to launch an attack. Long Yongru came to Taiwan in 2002 and was 
told by her father in Jiangsu about the railway transportation of tanks and other heavy 
weaponry. Her father believed that this was part of the deployment for attacking Taiwan 
and that ‘Taiwan is soon to be taken over’ (interviewed in Taipei on 27 March 2009). At 
those tense moments, Christian Zhong Meiling remembered praying for peace and safety 
of the people in Taiwan. 
The CCP’s criticism about Taiwan’s electoral politics created an unintended publicity 
about the democratic system operating in Taiwan. The free-wheeling democracy as 
selectively reported by the CCP, such as the physical brawling by Taiwan’s legislators,  
left Chinese viewers with the impression that, in Taiwan, politics was chaotic and that 
social life was in disorder. Dong Mei, a senior high school graduate who worked in a law 
firm and a tourist agency in Guangdong, remembered that her political education textbook 
described the change of government by election as ‘a see-saw game played by politicians’ 
and the wellbeing of people was at stake because of a lack of policy consistency. 
Nevertheless, such publicity strengthened the perception of political differences across 
the strait and fed the appetite of  curiosity. 
In spite of the indoctrination about Taiwan being a part of China, in reality, Taiwan 
may feel as foreign as any other country. The fact that entry to Taiwan is unilaterally 
controlled by the government of Taiwan drives home the message that Taiwan is outside 
the jurisdiction of the PRC government; Taiwan proper is not a part of China. For some, 
this was understood as ‘One Country, Two Systems’ as entry to Hong Kong was also 
controlled by the Hong Kong government; for others, this suggested that Taiwan and 
China are two separate political entities and that neither has control over the other. The 
blending of the nationalistic imagination and the political distance defines the lure of the 
Taiwan mystique, particularly before the government of Taiwan opened door for Chinese 
tourists. Chongqing-born An Qilan worked in Chengdu and Shenzhen for  10  years 
before moving to Taiwan. For her, moving to Mandarin-speaking Taiwan was different 
from moving to Cantonese-speaking Shenzhen and Hong Kong. This conceptual differ- 
ence was so complex that she could only say ‘Because of the history behind, you know, 
about Zheng Chenggong, Chiang Kai-shek, all that. If you’re allowed to go to Taiwan, 
you’ll see it as an honour. If you don’t go, you’ll regret it’ (interviewed in Taipei on      
23 March 2009). 
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From nationalistic curiosity and the paradox that Taiwan was neither foreign nor 
controlled by the PRC, there emerged a set of conceptions about Taiwan.  That  is, 
Taiwan is economically prosperous, politically democratic, and socially open. Moving   
to Taiwan is unlike a domestic movement within China because of the associated 
nationalistic mystique and the different political, social and economic systems. On the 
other hand, it is also unlike migrating to a foreign country where one cannot speak the 
local language and where there are physical differences. This makes Taiwan ‘neither 
foreign nor domestic’, a cognitive complex more realistic than the simplistic belief that 
‘Taiwan is a part of China’. 
Holding onto the conceptual hierarchy spiced by the nationalistic curiosity and the 
‘neither foreign nor domestic’ paradox, the interviewees entered Taiwan and were con- 
fronted by the contradictions between the conceptual hierarchy and the assertions of 
Taiwanese identity as well as the operation of an electoral  democracy. 
 
 
After migration: political re-socialisation in everyday  life 
Taiwanese  versus Mainlander 
One of the most significant aspects of their political re-socialisation in Taiwan was the 
exposure to the divide that underpins the partisan politics. Believing that the people of 
Taiwan, except the aborigines, are part of the Chinese race, Chinese women found 
themselves stepping onto the unfamiliar political terrain which is defined by the divide 
between native Taiwanese (benshengren) and Mainlanders (waishengren). This divide 
was a matter of confusion and its political connotation a source of potential   conflict. 
In spite of praising the civility of the people of Taiwan (taiwanren), the interviewees 
found themselves confronted by the former’s discrimination and hostility. The unfriendli- 
ness and otherness that the people of Taiwan hold against Chinese immigrants was 
conveyed by the derogatory terms daluren (Mainland people)  or dalumei  (Mainland 
girls) uttered in Mandarin as well as Taiwanese language (taiyu).
36  
Brief encounters   
with strangers or daily interactions with neighbours can amplify the sense of exclusion. 
The experience of Auntie Zhang, a retired accountant from Jiangxi, is a case in point. She 
was once publicly scolded by an elderly Taiwanese-speaking man in the Longshan 
Temple area of Taipei. She told the man that she could not understand his query in 
Taiwanese. The man shouted angrily ‘Learn Taiwanese!’ before he dashed off to his bus. 
Granny Yang, a retired chemical engineer from Wuhan, intended to learn Taiwanese, but 
her Mainlander husband discouraged her because her strong accent would immediately 
give away her origin and this revelation would invite more insults and ridicule, to which 
he himself was subject before. After her husband passed away, Granny Yang was 
introduced to a church by a neighbour whom she described as a ‘second-generation 
Mainlander’ and who took pity on her. The atmosphere in the church was amicable as 
long as there was no talk of politics. However, she was disappointed that the fellowship 
preferred to chat in Taiwanese in spite of her protestation that she could not understand. 
As they tried to persuade her to vote for the DPP presidential candidate in 2008, she 
claimed that her church was a ‘pro-independence church’. These events not only convey 
the hostility of Taiwanese speakers (benshengren) but also indicate the hostility of the 
people of Taiwan (taiwanren). 
Whilst Chinese women encountered animosity of Taiwanese speakers, they seemed to 
be included into the Mainlander community. Depending on their age, they might be 
mistaken  for  those  who  exiled  to  Taiwan  around  1949  or  the  Taiwan-born  second 
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generation. More importantly, Chinese women might also self-identify as Mainlanders. 
For example, Zhang Jie from Sichuan who had acquired citizenship regarded those who 
joined the anti-corruption demonstration in 2007 as ‘We Mainlanders (waishengren) are 
the main supporters of the anti-corruption protest’ (interviewed in Taipei on 15 April 
2009). During a bus journey, Zou Zirong, a former state-owned factory worker from 
Guangxi, was told off by a Taiwanese-speaking woman, who complained about Zirong 
speaking loudly on the phone. They exchanged insults and accused each other as being 
materialistic and condescending. The silent bus driver, who later identified himself as a 
second-generation Mainlander, deliberately skipped the stop at which the local woman 
requested to get off. He complained to Zirong that, as a Mainlander, he was also 
discriminated against by Taiwanese speakers, a frustration that might derive from the 
allegedly intensified ethnic divide under the DPP government. On the whole, acquiring a 
Mainlander identity, either by prescription or subscription, seemed to be acceptable by 
Chinese immigrants as this categorisation felt more inclusive than being rejected as being 
rowdy and poverty-stricken Mainland people (daluren). 
However, paradoxically, the amicability of Mainlanders in the public domain may not 
be felt in the private family life, as found by Auntie Zhang, Auntie Liu, and Luo Yingzhu. 
Although their step-children were second-generation Mainlanders and mainly spoke 
Mandarin, they were born and bred in Taiwan. If  the  three  women had expected to  
have a friendly relationship with their step-children, they were  disappointed  that  at 
times their step-children were not unlike the people of Taiwan (taiwanren), who uttered   
a sense of superiority to Chinese people, despised made-in-China products, and rejected 
foods brought back from China. Confused Auntie Zhang thus asked, ‘Aren’t they also 
Taiwanese (taiwanren)?’ At that juncture, even the belonging of the first-generation 
Mainlanders became uncertain. As Auntie Liu wittingly concluded, ‘the old men have 
lived in Taiwan for more than 60 years. They are Mainlanders in Taiwan, but they are 
Taiwanese Compatriots (taibao) in China. They belong to nowhere!’ (Zhang, Liu inter- 
viewed on 25 March, Luo on 17 March 2009, all in   Taipei). 
The interviewees’ random encounters with the general public and the daily interac- 
tions with their step-children illuminate not only the divide between ‘Taiwanese’ and 
‘Mainlander’ but also the shifting boundary between the two categories. Hostility and 
discrimination towards Chinese immigrants was found amongst the people of Taiwan 
(taiwanren) and Taiwanese speakers (benshengren). However, exclusion as such was also 
confusingly evident in the words and deeds of their step-children, who were expected to 
be inclusive Mainlanders (waishengren). However, the question ‘Aren’t they also 
Taiwanese?’ (taiwanren) manifested how the boundary of categories shifted: by patrilineal 
tie (born to Mainlander fathers), they were Mainlanders; by primordial link (born and bred 
in Taiwan), they were Taiwanese (taiwanren); by factual acts (hostility), they were 
Taiwanese (taiwanren). This confusion was part of their political re-socialisation in the 
sense that it revealed the dynamic internal chasm of the host society and that othering 
Chinese was a way to ascertain the Taiwanese identity. Both made the central-peripheral 
conceptual hierarchy unrealistic and obsolete. 
 
Machiavellian democracy and campaigning for   self-interest 
Democracy is integral to Taiwan’s self-identity, as seen in the legislative initiatives of the 
Act Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. 
First raised by the KMT in the draft bill of 1990 and later repeated by the DPP in the 
amendment of 2002, democracy was upheld to mark the difference between Taiwan   and 
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China. Whether the PRC Chinese were adaptive to a democratic life was an underlined 
concern of the incumbent government, as the founding values of communist and democratic 
systems were deemed incompatible.
37 
Thus, it is important to explore how the Chinese 
women perceived the operation of democracy in Taiwan. As explained below, their con- 
ceptualisation of democracy was largely shaped by their political socialisation in China. 
Auntie Shi’s view on the KMT-anchored residency regulations is a good example in 
this regard. Between 1992 and 1999, under the KMT’s watch, the habitation of Chinese 
wives in Taiwan was defined as one of visitation rather than residency. This definition 
permitted them only a maximum of a 6-month staying every year until they bore children 
or were married for 2 years.
38 
This regulation forced Auntie Shi, a retired primary school 
teacher from Guangdong, to depart for China every 6 months. This incurred a heavy 
burden on their tight finances and deprived her elderly and sick husband of her care. What 
she inferred from this restriction was that Chinese immigration was not welcome by the 
KMT government: ‘You want to get married, but there’s a policy that restricts you. This is 
the law of the land that you’ve got to abide by. This is like in the Mainland that you’re 
limited to have one child, otherwise you’ll be fined.’ It was notable that this restriction 
was thought of as inhumane as the One Child Policy. When asked whether she took part 
in protesting against this legislation in May and October 1998, she shrugged and replied 
‘We didn’t think about revolting’ (interviewed on 19 March 2009 in Taipei). It is clear that 
in her understanding, to protest in support of her self-interest was to rebel against the 
power of the state (be it democratic or repressive), and this was a fight that would not be 
fought by ‘ordinary people’ like herself. 
Related to this passive view was to see democracy as a variation of realpolitik. Granny 
Yang witnessed the purge of her family and her Indonesian Chinese colleagues during the 
Cultural Revolution. In her perception, politics was fuelled by a craving for power and that 
Machiavellianism was the politicians’ tradecraft. By nature, an elected president was no 
different from an emperor. In a pyramid society where the powerful were few and the masses 
were at the same time powerless, democracy facilitated a stage for the elites to perform 
populist acts in order to win the votes of the masses at the bottom of society. The equal value 
of each ballot ‘either held by the Nobel Prize-laureate Lee Yuan-tze or held by a greengrocer’ 
gave politicians incentives for vote buying (interviewed on 13 March 2009 in Taipei). 
In spite of this passive view, other interviewees did not miss the facility provided by 
democracy to pursue their interest. Both Zhang Jinhua and Granny Yang argued that 
Chinese immigrants’ rights and entitlement were an equation of the fluctuated Taiwan- 
China relationship. For Jinhua, a school teacher from Guangxi and a self-styled activist, a 
way to de-politicise Chinese immigrants was to support candidates who campaigned for 
immigrants’ causes, regardless of their party affiliation. For her, this de-politicisation was 
also derived from her argument that Chinese women are not interested in   politics: 
 
Once we acquire citizenship and have a satisfying life slightly better than the one in China, 
we’ll be quiet. We won’t be mobilised or organised to oppose anyone. Why? We’re just 
women who married to Taiwan. We have no political intentions. The [PRC] government 
won’t use us as secret agents…. Marriage has nothing to do with politics. (Interviewed on 10 
March 2009 in Taipei) 
 
Jinhua’s narratives highlighted her familiarity with the presumption that Chinese immi- 
grants were inclined to support the KMT and were the Fifth Column of the PRC. Her 
appeal of de-politicisation revealed their vulnerability in the partisan politics and the 
Taiwan-China relationship. 
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Unlike Auntie Shi’s inaction, other interviewees took part in the rights-claim move- 
ment in varying ways. Long Yongru, who had a string of laborious jobs and who was yet 
to acquire citizenship, went out onto the street demanding the improvement of the legal 
treatment for Chinese immigrants, whereas former school teacher Wong Hong dissemi- 
nated information about the protest and encouraged others to join. For those who did not 
join the rally, they were also well versed about the unfavourable citizenship legislation 
under which Chinese were regulated. The unfavourable treatment results from the ambi- 
guity that PRC citizens are still constitutionally regarded as ROC nationals, hence PRC 
citizens and foreign nationals are placed under two different sets of legislation and the 
duration of residency required of the former is longer than that of the latter for their 
citizenship eligibility.
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This differentiation was perplexing because in the ethnocentric 
worldview of Chinese immigrants, they, and the people of Taiwan, are of the same 
Chinese race, culture and ancestry. Thus, the people of Taiwan should embrace Chinese 
immigrants as equal ‘us-members’ rather than treat them as outsiders of a legal status 
lower than that of Southeast Asian immigrants. This puzzle was another wake-up call to 
their ethnocentric worldview which did not consider the reality of the separation of the 
ROC from the PRC. 
 
 
Taking  part in partisan  politics, facing it at work and   home 
If they were slow to come to terms with the political reality across the strait, they were 
highly sensitive to DPP’s anti-China stance and perceived themselves as particularly 
unwelcome by the DPP. For example, Tong Hongying, a seasoned 28-year-old business- 
woman from Guangdong, detected a political agenda behind the DPP’s introduction of 
entry clearance interviews in 2003: the DPP intended to put a brake on the settlement of 
Chinese immigrants. In response, some chose to openly confront the DPP. For example, 
Zou Zirong and Hu Hailan, a retired state-owned factory worker from Hubei, joined the 
2007 ‘Red Shirt Army’ anti-corruption demonstration. They went for days without 
attending their hourly-paid employment as a cleaner and a caregiver. Granny Yang, who 
described her church as pro-independence, refrained from wearing anything red to conceal 
her colour. Notably, unlike their older counterparts who chose to join the partisan protest, 
younger Chinese interviewees appeared less zealous. An Qilan, a former migrant worker 
from Chengdu to Shenzhen, consciously kept a low profile in her workplace. Working as 
a shop assistant in a high-end department store whose business relied on good customer 
service, she took the advice of a good-intentioned local colleague given on the first day on 
the job and refrained from talking about politics with another colleague who was known 
as a staunch DPP supporter. 
The pressure of partisan politics was also, if not more, evident in the home. Zhu 
Yongli, who received 2-year primary education in rural Guangxi before migrating to 
Dongguan for work, was brought to understand the significance of voting in the context of 
partisan politics by her Taiwanese-speaking mother-in-law. Before Yongli acquired her 
citizenship, her mother-in-law was mindful about her ineligibility to vote and thought it 
regrettable that she could not instruct Yongli to vote. Little did she know that Yongli had 
already determined to abstain after becoming eligible. Living under the shadow of her 
matriarchal mother-in-law, Yongli perceived the latter’s intention in the context of partisan 
politics along the line of Taiwan-China antagonism. Moreover, her narratives indicated an 
emerging constituency of Chinese immigrants as opposed to DPP  supporters: 
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Of course they, Taiwanese, would hope to gain one more vote. If I helped the Taiwanese, 
surely we Chinese would be upset. If I didn’t help them (Taiwanese), my husband and 
mother-in-law would be unhappy. (Q: But nobody can see what you’re doing in the voting 
booth.) I’d rather do nothing and upset no one. (Interviewed on 21 April 2009 in   Taipei) 
 
If DPP supporters, such as Zhu Yongli’s mother-in-law and Granny Yang’s church, 
attempted at converting Chinese women’s political inclinations, the party did not seem 
keen to achieve the same goals. In the eyes of Long Yongru, the DPP’s anti-Chinese 
animosity was magnified by its 2008 presidential candidate Frank Hsieh’s insult, which 
likened Taiwanese men who married Chinese women to those of prostitute clients. What 
can be inferred was that Frank Hsieh, and the DPP, were not interested in winning their 
votes. However, as far as citizenship legislation was concerned, the reluctance to admit 
PRC Chinese to become ROC citizens was consistently maintained from the KMT to the 
DPP government.
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Granny Yang argued that, in this regard, the KMT was implicit and 
covert, and the DPP was explicit and overt. Zhang Jinhua further articulated that the KMT 
was anti-communist but the DPP was anti-China. 
The above analysis demonstrated how the interviewees encountered the ethnic divide 
and partisan politics in the everyday interactions with their neighbours, families, collea- 
gues, and members of the general public. Being some of the very few Chinese who could 
cast their votes in Taiwan, the interviewees were passive about their political rights in 
principle, but, for advancing self-interest, they did not leave their political rights idle. On 
the contrary, they utilised democracy and campaigned for improving their legal treatment. 
In contrast to the government’s essentialisation of ‘un-democratic’ Chinese, their com- 
munist upbringing did not necessarily automate an inability for democratic participation. 
Holding to the central-peripheral hierarchy, they felt hijacked by the DPP’s aversion to 
China. They were negatively affected by the divide between Taiwanese and Mainlanders, 
but their political re-socialisation could go as far as acquiring a Mainlander identity for its 
inclusion. Although there was a noted confusion of defining ‘Taiwanese’ and 
‘Mainlander’, some were comfortable with the acquired Mainlander identity and some 
acted upon it in the anti-corruption demonstration. If their understanding of ethnic divide 
was intertwined with partisan politics, their dissatisfaction with their unfavourable legal 
status was beyond partisan politics. Whilst younger interviewees, such as Tong Hongying, 
were quick to criticise the hostility they received from the DPP, seasoned older inter- 
viewees, such as Auntie Shi, Granny Yang, and Zhang Jinhua, who called on their 
experiences of living under the KMT during the 1990s, argued that neither the KMT 
nor the DPP welcomed their settlement in Taiwan. 
To sum up, my analysis shows that the interviewees were conscious of being the 
inferior and hostile other to the people of Taiwan. They were used as political tokens by 
the two political parties in their relationship with China. Auntie Zhang’s puzzle, referring 
to the so-called second-generation Mainlanders – Aren’t they also Taiwanese? – pro- 
nounced their unstated understanding that they personified China as the Other to the 
Taiwanese identity, behind which the people of Taiwan were unified as a whole by their 
hostility, discrimination and distrust towards Chinese. Whilst being excluded as the other 
and unable to clearly draw the distinction amongst local ethnic groups, they nevertheless 
found accommodation behind a Mainlander identity and acted upon this identity along the 
line of partisan politics. 
With their political re-socialisation explained, I will turn to analyse whether these 
experiences have any impact on their conceptual hierarchy and whether this impact affects 
their self-positioning vis-à-vis Taiwan. 
426 
 
 
The conceptual hierarchy challenged: bridging across or sandwiched   between? 
As mentioned above, Chinese immigrants’ worldview contradicts the Taiwanese identity. 
Although the latter does not shy away from its continental Chinese origin, it nevertheless 
stresses that Taiwan is a society built by immigration from China, and the immigrant 
society has developed a culture and identity distinctively varied from its Chinese origin.
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Attempting at resolving the contradiction, the interviewees capitalised on the immi- 
gration theme of the Taiwanese identity. They articulated that they were also part of the 
continental immigration, but were the latest arrivals after the earlier immigrant groups of 
Hoklo, Hakka and Mainlanders. This articulation was rooted in the central-peripheral 
hierarchy. That is, not only did it subordinate all ethnic groups in Taiwan to the ultimate 
unified Chinese nation but also emphasise their shared origins. Thus, the interviewees 
asserted their rightful membership of the national community of Taiwan. By doing so, the 
interviewees extrapolated their origin from the supreme, ultimate, and larger unit, and 
placed themselves above the ‘Little Taiwan’ and the people of  Taiwan. 
However, this appropriation failed to resolve other frictions. Taiwan regards itself as a 
sovereign and independent state separate from China, and the island’s culture and nation 
have been transformed from a Chinese monopoly to a convergence of multiple origins. 
Taiwan is a new nation born out of, but not restricted to, its Chinese origin. For older 
interviewees, ethnocentrism reigned supreme. Taiwan remained Chinese, although they 
had difficulties in exacting the political status of Taiwan. They identified with Taiwan for 
endowing them with civility, the modernity of public infrastructure, an efficient civil 
service, and expanding welfare provided by a free democracy and a vibrant economy. 
They supported Taiwan in applying to join the World Health Organisation because ‘it’s 
good for the people of Taiwan’, but they opposed the bidding for membership of the 
United Nations as Taiwan is not a state. In sum, tightly entwined with the ethnocentric 
worldview, they identified Taiwan for its beneficial way of life, but they could not identify 
Taiwan as it claims itself now: a sovereign ROC on Taiwan that is separate from and 
independent of the PRC. 
Logically deriving from their worldview was to support an ultimate unification and 
ending the prolonged status quo. Nevertheless, they argued that there was no need to rush. 
For the time being, maintaining the status quo should be the top priority for both sides. 
However, status quo did not mean static. Rather, it was hoped to render more economic 
exchanges and thus achieve co-prosperity. The aspiration for prosperity was a deep 
reflection upon the hardship caused by futile mass political movements where their 
youthful years were engulfed. The interaction was also hoped to further open Taiwan to 
the Chinese so that the Chinese could witness how freedom and democracy operated in 
Taiwan. 
Taking part in partisan politics and making use of democracy for their self-interests 
did not wipe out their impression of ‘chaotic’ democracy. The fierce electoral competition 
was cognitively analogous to ‘class struggle’ and was feared for its consequence: if the 
unification versus independence debate developed into a showdown with the PRC, the 
feared consequence was war. Having experienced ‘what the CCP was capable of’, and 
what war was like, they felt compelled to advise not to tempt fate with an angry giant. 
However, despite their repeated stress that war was disastrous and that nobody wanted a 
war, the ultimate unification was so internalised as a belief and destined as the sacred 
mission promised to Chinese ancestors that if everything failed to achieve it, as Auntie Shi 
proclaimed, then ‘war is the last resort’. At this juncture, Granny Yang murmured ‘that 
(the war) would teach you little Taiwan a lesson!’ Placing herself as being opposite to the 
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‘little Taiwan’, Granny Yang’s emotional response revealed that strictly adhering to the 
conceptual hierarchy was also a form of micro resistance with which to defeat the 
exclusion, discrimination, and otherness they were subjected to in Taiwan. Auntie Shi 
concluded that Taiwan’s claim of statehood was not recognised by China and China’s 
stance was internationally accepted. As if corresponding to Granny Yang’s views, Auntie 
Shi concluded the discussion by saying: 
 
China is no doubt a great power. It stands high in the world, and its voice counts significantly 
(中國肯定是大國,它的發言權很重要,在世界是頂天立地). (Both interviewed on 19 March 
2009 in Taipei) 
 
The rise of China clearly boosted Chinese immigrants’ pride. Speaking out on behalf of 
China, their words politically dwarfed Taiwan, belittled the people of Taiwan who 
despised Chinese immigrants, and thus maintained their self-dignity. 
In contrast to their older counterparts’ uniform adherence to the conceptual hierarchy, 
younger interviewees showed a spectrum of deviation and developed identification with 
Taiwan of varying strength. For 42-year-old Long Yun, who held a doctoral degree in 
science from a foreign country, travelling on an ROC passport abroad meant that Taiwan 
should be considered as an independent state. But what made more sense to her was that 
this state should be formally titled ‘Republic of Taiwan’, rather than ‘Republic of China’. 
After all, ‘How can an entity strive to preserve a title that has been extinguished?’ 
(interviewed on 5 April 2009 in Miaoli). After enjoying the freedom of information in 
Taiwan for 12 years, Jiang Derong supported neither unification nor independence but the 
status quo. She stressed that this was a conscious deviation from the fixed position of 
unification held by most Chinese because she now recognised there were other options. 
Had she stayed in China, she ‘would not know any other options but unification because 
in China education is the means of brainwashing’ and the brainwashing is ‘as dogmatic as 
in North Korea’ (interviewed on 12 June 2009 in  Taipei). 
For Gong Pingying, Jiang Juan, Lin Xiaoqi, An Qilan, Ma Xinting, and Tong 
Hongying, who were mostly mothers of young children, they envisaged that their future 
hinged on Taiwan’s development and this was translated into their support for the status 
quo. What is noteworthy is that maintaining the status quo was not considered as a 
‘second best’ option. Rather, it was the option that excluded either China forcing through 
unification or Taiwan declaring independence. This was because unification was per- 
ceived as ‘better-off Taiwan being dragged down by a worse-off China’ and declaring 
independence resulted in war. Neither was in Taiwan’s interest, hence it was also not in 
their interest. Thus, they remained Chinese and saw Taiwan as a part of China, but they 
identified with Taiwan for the prospect of maintaining  prosperity. 
Wong Hong’s change was most radical. She recognised Taiwan as an independent 
state whilst still adhering to her ethnocentric view that Taiwan is Chinese. The central- 
peripheral hierarchy used to be the guiding worldview for her to interact with local people. 
Similar to Granny Yang’s utterance ‘teach you little Taiwan a lesson’, when Hong was 
insulted by the derogatory term Mainland Girl (dalumei), supporting the use of force was 
her weapons to defend her self-dignity, as expressed in her own words: ‘Let’s see if you 
dare [to call me Mainland Girl] when we send troops over!’ In other words, the stigma- 
tisation of Chinese people in Taiwan adversely reinforced the conceptual hierarchy, and 
the conceptual hierarchy was evoked as a means of micro resistance and self-defence. 
However, her marriage to a middle-class man located her in a friendlier social environ- 
ment, which was conducive for her to ‘gradually understand and accept that the history in 
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the eyes of Taiwanese people is different from what we (Chinese) think’ (interviewed on 
18 March 2009 in Taipei). 
In her modified views, migrating to Taiwan was moving to another country and 
Taiwan is an independent state separate from China.  China should realistically admit  
that Taiwan’s ‘state machines have been running independently of China’s interference’. 
On the other hand, for Taiwan, without a formal independence declaration, the indepen- 
dence claim is inevitably subject to external challenges. Beside these modifications, there 
was also continuity, which was to view the nation of Taiwan as ethnically Chinese. What 
differentiates Taiwan and China is the political system and the way of life, not ethnicity; 
Taiwan remains ethnically Chinese. 
The most dramatic projection of their self-positioning in relation to Taiwan and China 
was where the interviewees stood in the case of war. For older interviewees, they preferred 
to leave Taiwan because there was no doubt that the PRC would crush Taiwan. For 
younger interviewees, whose affection with Taiwan grew out of motherhood, betterment 
and home-building, they were reluctant to envisage the possibility of war. Jiang Juan 
imagined that they were the bridge to maintain the flesh-and-blood relationship between 
China and Taiwan. This imagination was inspired by her friend, who linked the macro 
political future to their micro familial tie across the  strait: 
 
Perhaps, in the future, the central Chinese leadership will be born to a family whose relatives 
have settled in Taiwan. Perhaps, in the future, the central Taiwanese leadership will be born to 
a family whose mother is originally from China. (Interviewed on 16 March 2009 in   Taipei) 
 
The metaphor of ‘bridge’ grown out of a mother identity demonstrated how family ties 
generated a relational identity
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linked to both sides. The gendered link across the strait 
visualised their in-between position. However, the in-betweenness could also lead to 
pessimism. For Ming Xianglan, who suffered the CCP’s terror during the Cultural 
Revolution, her in-betweenness was punctuated by the expected distrust of both sides:  
she would be suspected by Taiwan as a communist agent and by China as a sympathiser 
of Taiwan. She would be disowned by both sides. Thus, the same in-between situation led 
to two extremes. One was a gendered optimism rendered by motherhood; the other was 
realistic pessimism reacting to the exclusionary and emotional politics of  identity. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This research informed preliminary findings of the ambiguous and complex political re-
socialisation of Chinese immigrant women and their encounter with the Taiwanese 
identity. Not attempting at reaching statistical representativeness, the small sample of 
interviewees provides dynamic and contextual understanding of norms, values, and 
institutions. By contrasting their conceptions before and after migration along the cen- 
tral-peripheral hierarchy, this paper elaborated the encounters of their nationalistic curi- 
osity and understanding of democracy with the Taiwanese identity. Between them and 
family members, neighbours, colleagues and the general public, these daily, sometimes 
mundane, encounters manifested the contradictions between their worldview and the 
ethnic divide and partisan politics in Taiwan. Their political re-socialisation proved that 
their worldview, which perpetuated the inflexibility of the Taiwan-China relationship, was 
inadequate to deal with the Taiwanese-Mainlander divide and the anti-China sentiment. 
Adopting or being prescribed to a Mainlander identity could potentially ameliorate the 
impact  and  secure  support  for  the  KMT  as  shown  in  their  enthusiasm  in  the  anti- 
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corruption demonstration. Even without a Mainlander identity, the DPP’s animosity 
towards China – magnified by its politician’s discriminatory slur – was effective to 
cultivate their distrust towards the party. 
Whilst being engrossed by the ethnic divide, they also brought to the foreground the 
shifting boundary between Taiwanese (benshengren) and Mainlander and highlight the 
fact that, by othering China and Chinese, ‘Taiwanese’ (taiwanren) has also become a 
collective identity shared by the people of Taiwan. The interviewees’ narratives pointed 
out that behind the partisan rhetoric, when facing China and Chinese, the KMT and DPP 
converged on, rather than disagreed with, the concerns of security, stability and ideational 
values of democracy. What may seem ironic is that whilst the government of Taiwan is 
concerned about their adaptation to democracy, and in spite that some of them held a 
passive view about democracy, some interviewees were active in either protest politics or 
rights-claim movement. The former showed their political orientation; the latter informed 
that self-interest was a motive of political participation. 
Political re-socialisation gained through daily life gradually fed into their interpreta- 
tion of the Taiwanese identity. Whilst the older generation showed dim prospect of 
absorbing the reality of Taiwan’s de facto independence, the younger generation presented 
varying degrees of deviation from the central-peripheral hierarchy. Their differences 
implied that a gendered relational identity based on motherhood and home-building 
would be more likely to cultivate a Taiwanese identity amongst the younger generation. 
Nevertheless, they would continue to see Taiwanese as ethnically and culturally Chinese. 
Situated in the antagonism between Taiwan and China, they were locked in an unenviable 
in-between tension. Their optimism of bridging across the strait would nevertheless be 
dampened by the suspicion and exclusion of both sides which demand their singular and 
undivided loyalty. 
To conclude, this paper suggests that political re-socialisation is possible for immi- 
grants who are from a political polity of opposing values or views. This paper aligns itself 
with the argument that studying political participation should not only focus on turnout 
rate or types of political acts (De Rooji 2010: 455). The interviewees’ narratives illumi- 
nate that re-socialisation should not only be understood for whether and how they utilise 
political institutions (voting, protesting, campaigning) but also why they choose to do so. 
The latter may render more contextual indications to their integration and sense of 
belonging, the ultimate goal of re-socialisation. 
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Appendix. Interviewees’ Background 
Name Age Hometown Residency (years) S Domicile in Taiwan Education Marriage No. of Children 
Ming Xianglan 46 Hainan 15 C Sanchung JHS 1st 5 
Zhang Jie 42 Sichuan 15 C Keelung JHS 1st 1 
Yuan Panpan 38 Shanxi 14 C Keelung SHS 1st 2 
Shi Huijing 38 Guangdong 14 C Fangliao JHS 1st 2 
Yen Yifan 32 Anhui 12 C Pateh JHS 1st 2 
Lin Jinxia 32 Fujian 12 C Keelung JC 1st 2 
Jiang Derong 30 Hubei 12 C Taipei VS 1st 2 
Chen Qing 39 Shandong 11 C Tantsu University 1st 1 
Lu Minhan 32 Anhui 10 C Keelung SHS 1st 2 
Long Yun 32 Shanghai 9 C Taoyuan PhD 1st 1 
Zhu Yongli 36 Guangxi 9 C Taipei PS 1st 2 
Hu Nanhua 36 Hunan 9 C Taichung VS 2nd 1 
Zhang Ting 33 Sichuan 7 R Keelung PS 1st 1 
Wong Hong 36 Hubei 6 R Hsintian university 2nd 1 
Shi Yiping 33 Sichuan 6 R Chaochou JHS 1st 3 
Dong Mei 26 Guangdong 4 R Patu SHS 1st nil 
Tng Hongying 28 Guangdong 4 R Hsichi JHS 1st 1 
Bai Ling 37 Guangxi 4 R Taipei university 2nd ? 
Gung Pingying 29 Anhui 3 R Hsintian SHS 1st 1 
Jiang Juan 30 Shandong 3 R Taipei SHS 1st 1 
Lin Xiaoqi 26 Anhui 3 R Taipei SHS 1st 1 
An Qilan 33 Sichuan 3 R Taipei SHS 1st ? 
Ma Xinting 29 Anhui 3 R Taipei SHS 1st ? 
Mi Yuping 32 Guangxi 2 R Chungli SHS 1st 1 
Gu Minjun 24 Anhui 10 months F Kaohsiung JHS 1st 1 
Ren Xia 44 Shanghai 6 months F Taipei SHS 1st nil 
Granny Yang 71 Hubei 15 C Taipei University 2nd nil 
Zhang Jinhua ? Guangxi 15 R Taipei University 2nd 1 
Auntie Shih 60 Guangdong 13 C Taipei University 2nd 2 
Hu Hailan 57 Hubei 12 C Taipei SHS 2nd 1 
Wu Lili 56 Fujian 11 C Keelung PS 2nd 4 
(continued ) 
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Appendix. (Continued). 
Name Age Hometown Residency (years) S Domicile in Taiwan Education Marriage No. of Children 
 
Auntie Chang 67 Jiangxi 11 C Panchiao SHS 2nd 2 
Qian Aini 43 Fujian 10 C ? PS 2nd 3 
Zhong Meiling ? Fujian 9 C Tamshiu Illiterate 2nd 4 
Antie Liu 60 Sichuan 9 C Panchiao JHS 2nd 1 
Long Yongru 47 Jiangsu 7 R Hsichi SHS 2nd 2 
Xiao Yingran 48 Fujian 6 R Taipei ? 2nd 2 
Zou Zirong 50 Guangxi 4 R Taipei JHS 2nd 2 
Lou Yingzhu 60 Hubei 4 R Panchiao JHS 2nd 1 
Notes: 
All dates are calculated in 2009 and  2010. 
The Romanisation of the names and hometowns of the interviewees uses Hanyu Pinyin. The Romanisation of their domiciles in Taiwan uses Wade-Giles. 
Residency (years) = years of residing in Taiwan 
S = legal status 
C = citizenship 
R = residency 
F = family reunion 
SHS = senior high school 
JHS = junior high school 
PS = primary school 
VS = vocational school 
JC = junior college 
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